One of Nancy Cartwright's arguments for entity realism focuses on the non-redundancy of causal explanation. In How the Laws of Physics Lie she uses an example from laser theory to illustrate how we can have a variety of theoretical treatments governing the same phenomena while allowing just one causal story. In the following I show that in the particular example Cartwright chooses causal explanation exhibits the same kind of redundancy present in theoretical explanation. In an attempt to salvage Cartwright's (...) example the causal explanation could be reinterpreted as a capacity claim, as outlined in her recent work Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement. However, I argue that capacities cannot be isolated in the way that Cartwright suggests and consequently these capacity claims also fail to provide a unique causal story. We can, however, make sense of capacities by characterizing them in a relational way and I offer some ideas as to how this approach would retain our intuitions about capacities while denying their ontological priority as dormant powers. (shrink)

This letter replies to the letter “Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa,” by Luís Cordeiro‐Rodrigues, in the same, May‐June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.

As average lifespans stretch to new lengths, how are human values impacted? Should our values change over the course of our ever-increasing lifespans? Nancy S. Jecker introduces a new concept, the life stage relativity of values, which holds that at different life stages, different ethical concerns should take center stage. For Jecker, the privileging of midlife values raises fundamental problems of fairness, and reveals large gaps in ethical principles and theories. Jecker introduces a new philosophical framework that reflects the (...) life stage relativity of values and shows its relevance to practice and policy. (shrink)

This paper presents an African relational view of social robots’ moral standing which draws on the philosophy of ubuntu. The introduction places the question of moral standing in historical and cultural contexts. Section 2 demonstrates an ubuntu framework by applying it to the fictional case of a social robot named Klara, taken from Ishiguro’s novel, Klara and the Sun. We argue that an ubuntu ethic assigns moral standing to Klara, based on her relational qualities and pro-social virtues. Section 3 introduces (...) a second fictional case, taken from McKeown’s novel, Machines Like Me, in which a social robot named Adam displays intrinsic qualities, such as sentience, rationality, and deductive moral reasoning, yet lacks close social ties to particular people. We argue that Adam is not a person in the African sense; however, he qualifies as a person according to many standard Western views, such as Kantian and utilitarian ethics. Section 4 further elaborates the African relational view by comparing the moral standing of social robots and humans in a forced choice scenario. Section 5 replies to objections. We conclude that an African relational approach captures important insights about the moral standing of social robots that many Western accounts miss and should be better incorporated into global frameworks for designing and deploying social robots. (shrink)

This paper opens a critical conversation about the ethics of international bioethics conferencing and proposes principles that commit to being anti-discriminatory, global, and inclusive. We launch this conversation in the Section, Case Study, with a case example involving the International Association of Bioethics’ (IAB’s) selection of Qatar to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics. IAB’s choice of Qatar sparked controversy. We believe it also may reveal deeper issues of Islamophobia in bioethics. The Section, Principles for International Bioethics Conferencing, sets (...) forth and defends proposed principles for international bioethics conferencing. The Section, Applying Principles to Site Selection applies the proposed principles to the case example. The Section, Applying Principles Beyond Site Selection addresses other applications of the proposed principles. The Section, Objections responds to objections. We close (in the Section, Conclusion) by calling for a wider discussion of our proposed principles.One-Sentence Capsule Summary: How should bioethicists navigate the ethics of global bioethics conferencing? (shrink)

The requirement of randomization in experimental design was first stated by R. A. Fisher, statistician and geneticist, in 1925 in his book Statistical Methods for Research Workers. Earlier designs were systematic and involved the judgment of the experimenter; this led to possible bias and inaccurate interpretation of the data. Fisher's dictum was that randomization eliminates bias and permits a valid test of significance. Randomization in experimenting had been used by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1885 but the practice was not continued. (...) Fisher developed his concepts of randomizing as he considered the mathematics of small samples, in discussions with "Student," William Sealy Gosset. Fisher published extensively. His principles of experimental design were spread worldwide by the many "voluntary workers" who came from other institutions to Rothamsted Agricultural Station in England to learn Fisher's methods. (shrink)

This paper gives an ethical argument for temporarily waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines. It examines two proposals under discussion at the World Trade Organization : the India/South Africa proposal and the WTO Director General proposal. Section I explains the background leading up to the WTO debate. Section II rebuts ethical arguments for retaining current IP protections, which appeal to benefiting society by spurring innovation and protecting rightful ownership. It sets forth positive ethical arguments for a temporary waiver that (...) appeal to standing in solidarity and holding companies accountable. After examining built-in exceptions to existing agreements and finding them inadequate, the paper replies to objections to a temporary waiver and concludes, in section III, that the ethical argument for temporarily waiving IP protection for COVID-19 vaccines is strong. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

This paper argues that we can see our lives as a snapshot happening now or as a moving picture extending across time. These dual ways of seeing our lives inform how we conceive of the problem of age group justice. A snapshot view sees age group justice as an interpersonal problem between distinct age groups. A moving picture view sees age group justice as a first-person problem of prudential choice. This paper explores these different ways of thinking about age group (...) justice and illustrates them using a principle of respect for human dignity, understood in terms of reasonable support for floor level central human capabilities at each stage of life. I argue that different frames are suitable for different kinds of decisions, and each provides a true, but partial, picture of aging and age group justice. (shrink)

Societies of the East are often contrasted with those of the West in their stances toward technology. This paper explores these perceived differences in the context of international ethics guidance for artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Japan serves as an example of the East, while Europe and North America serve as examples of the West. The paper’s principal aim is to demonstrate that Western values predominate in international ethics guidance and that Japanese values serve as a much-needed corrective. We recommend (...) a hybrid approach that is more inclusive and truly ‘international’. Following an introduction, the paper examines distinct stances toward robots that emerged in the West and Japan, respectively, during the aftermath of the Second World War, reflecting history and popular culture, socio-economic conditions, and religious worldviews. It shows how international ethics guidelines reflect these disparate stances, drawing on a 2019 scoping review that examined 84 international AI ethics documents. These documents are heavily skewed toward precautionary values associated with the West and cite the optimistic values associated with Japan less frequently. Drawing insights from Japan’s so-called ‘moonshot goals’, the paper fleshes out Japanese values in greater detail and shows how to incorporate them more effectively in international ethics guidelines for AI and robotics. (shrink)

Collingwood’s “Libellus de Generatione: An Essay in Absolute Empiricism” was a tract of strenuous philosophical revisionism; never published, perhaps unpublishable, supposedly destroyed, it survived. He begins by stressing his obligations to David Hume; he offers his thematic: “absolute denial of any such concept as substance and the resolution of all reality into the reality of experience.” “The reality of mind is the process of its experience, its life, and nothing else”. Or, “the mind is a mirror... whose being is solely (...) the activity of reflecting”; it has no “substance of its own of which this activity is only a reflection”. Collingwood’s entire career as student and teacher... (shrink)

This paper addresses the just distribution of vaccines against the SARS-CoV-2 virus and sets forth an ethical framework that prioritises frontline and essential workers, people at high risk of severe disease or death, and people at high risk of infection. Section I makes the case that vaccine distribution should occur at a global level in order to accelerate development and fair, efficient vaccine allocation. Section II puts forth ethical values to guide vaccine distribution including helping people with the greatest need, (...) reducing health disparity, saving the most lives and promoting narrow social utility. It also responds to objections which claim that earlier years have more value than later years. Section III puts forth a practical ethical framework to aid decision-makers and compares it with alternatives. (shrink)

Social isolation and loneliness are ongoing threats to health made worse by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. During the pandemic, half the globe's population have been placed under strict physical distancing orders and many long-term care facilities serving older adults went into lockdown mode, restricting access to all visitors, including family members. Before the pandemic emerged, a 2020 National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine report warned of the underappreciated adverse effects of social isolation and loneliness on health, especially among (...) older populations. Social isolation and loneliness predict all-cause mortality at rates that rival clinical risk factors, such as obesity and smoking; they are associated with greater incidence of psychological, cognitive, and physical morbidities. This paper sets forth a proposal to design robots to function as companions and friends for socially isolated and lonely older people during pandemic emergencies and in aging societies more generally. “The proposal” section presents and defends the proposal. The “Replies to objections” section answers objections based on coercive design, replacement of humans with robots, privacy incursions, and counterfeit companionship. The “Conclusion” section submits that sociable robots offer a promising avenue for addressing social isolation and loneliness during pandemics and hold promise for aging societies more broadly. (shrink)

Do neurosurgical procedures ever result in the patient prior to the procedure not being identical with the individual who wakes up postsurgery in the hospital bed? We address this question by offering an analysis of the persistence of persons that emphasizes narrative, rather than numerical, identity. We argue that a narrative analysis carries the advantage of highlighting what matters to patients in their ordinary lives, explaining the varying degrees of persistence of personal identity, and enhancing our understanding of patients' experiences. (...) We illustrate these points in cases involving temporal lobectomy for treatment of refractory epilepsy and deep brain stimulation for refractory Parkinson's disease. (shrink)

This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, “The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.” In the original paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implica- tions for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of ‘pro-social,’ and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots.

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 128-132.

This paper raises health equity concerns about the use of passports for domestic and international travel to certify COVID-19 vaccination. Part I argues that for international travel, health equity objections undercut arguments defending vaccine passports, which are based on tholding people responsible, protecting global health, safeguarding individual liberty and continuing current practice. Part II entertains a proposal for a scaled down vaccine passport for domestic use in countries where vaccines are widely and equitably available. It raises health equity concerns related (...) to racial profiling and fairness to people who are vaccine cautious. Part III sets forth a proposal for a flexible pass that certifies people who have been vaccinated, tested, previously infected or granted a conscientious objection. It sets ethical guidelines for the timing and use of flexible passes that promote equity, public health education, antidiscrimination, privacy and flexibility. (shrink)

With the development of increasingly sophisticated sociable robots, robot-human relationships are being transformed. Not only can sociable robots furnish emotional support and companionship for humans, humans can also form relationships with robots that they value highly. It is natural to ask, do robots that stand in close relationships with us have any moral standing over and above their purely instrumental value as means to human ends. We might ask our question this way, ‘Are there ways we can act towards robots (...) that would be wrong to the robot?’ To address this, Part I lays out standard approaches to moral standing: appealing to intrinsic properties, human responses, and values inhering in relationships. Part II explores the third, relational strategy in detail. Looking beyond Western analyses, it considers Eastern philosophy and the environmental philosophy of 'deep ecology' and extends these approaches to sociable robots. Part III examines practical implications for the case of Samantha, a sex robot that was allegedly raped. Part IV identifies and replies to objections. (shrink)

In 2022, the International Association of Bioethics (IAB) announced that the 17th World Congress of Bioethics would be held in Doha, Qatar. In response to ethical concerns expressed about the Qatar selection, the IAB Board of Directors developed and posted to the IAB website a response using a Q&A format. In this Letter, we (the IAB President and Vice President) address concerns about the ethics of bioethics conferencing raised in a 2023 Letter to the Editor of Bioethics by Van der (...) Graaf et al. We do not represent the Board of Directors, and this Letter expresses solely our own views. (shrink)

An analysis of the exemplary strategy of Pasquier reveals an intriguing shift in the premises, procedures, and goals of his history, arising from the superimposition of an internalized medieval task on a very different humanist, or classicist, task. Machiavelli's classicizing exempla undermine his theory, while Pasquier's medieval exempla make sense of the Machiavellian project, and can be seen to disconnect the reader from the exemplary. Pasquier retains the Machiavellian analysis of efficiency while subverting the duty of heroic imitation. The priority (...) of consensual purpose over individual action which David assigned to the medieval exemplum reinforces the priority of community over citizen in Pasquier's historical politics. Pasquier's exempla impose on the French reader the obligation of assimilating his or her own laws and history. His initiative is felicitous in comparison with modern projects as well; he reaffirms morality as essentially public, shared, and refuses the inconsistency of deriving a public morality from an infinity of personal acts. (shrink)

Professor Rubini's excellent study, The Other Renaissance: Italian Humanism Between Hegel and Heidegger, contends that modern Italian philosophy is a philosophy self-consciously constructed by an a...

Social isolation and loneliness are growing concerns around the globe that put people at increased risk of disease and early death. One much‐touted approach to addressing them is deploying artificially intelligent agents to serve as companions for socially isolated and lonely people. Focusing on digital humans, we consider evidence and ethical arguments for and against this approach. We set forth and defend public health policies that respond to concerns about replacing humans, establishing inferior relationships, algorithmic bias, distributive justice, and data (...) privacy. (shrink)

Is age discrimination ethically objectionable? One puzzle is that we sometimes assume that the target of both age discrimination and ageism must be older people, yet in poorer nations, older people are generally shown more respect. This article explores the ethical question. It looks first at ethical arguments favoring age discrimination toward younger people in low‐income, less industrialized countries of the global South, using sub‐Saharan Africa as an illustration. It contrasts these with arguments favoring age discrimination toward older people in (...) high‐income, more industrialized countries of the global North, particularly the United States and United Kingdom. Finally, it considers what role, if any, differences in life expectancy, infant and child mortality, and prospects for healthy lives should play in the moral embrace of a particular view by a community. It argues that there can be reasons to favor different types of discrimination in different parts of the world. (shrink)

Since the World Health Organization first declared the novel coronavirus a pandemic, diverse strategies have emerged to address it. This paper focuses on two leading strategies, elimination and mitigation, and examines their ethical basis. Elimination or ‘Zero-COVID’ dominates policies in Pacific Rim societies. It sets as a goal zero deaths and seeks to contain transmission using stringent short-term lockdowns, followed by strict find, test, trace and isolate methods. Mitigation, which dominates in the US and most European nations, sets targets for (...) community transmission and lifts restrictions once targets are met. This approach takes calculated risks and regards a certain amount of disease and death as ethically justified. Section I examines different societal responses to risk that underlie these different policy approaches. Section II focuses on ethical arguments favouring Zero-COVID and raises health equity objections. Section III proposes a long-term strategy that balances the twin goals of promoting population health and health equity. There are no data available for this work. (shrink)

This paper describes a global pattern of declining academic freedom, often driven by powerful political interference with core functions of academic communities. It argues that countering threats to academic freedom requires doubling down on ethics, specifically standards of justice and fairness in pursuing knowledge and assigning warrant to beliefs. Using the example of the selection of a Qatari university to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics, the authors urge fairness towards diverse groups over time and efforts to counter injustices (...) that conferences generate. (shrink)

Our aims are to set forth a multiprinciple system for selecting among clinical trials competing for limited space in an immunotherapy production facility that supplies products under investigation by scientific investigators; defend this system by appealing to justice principles; and illustrate our proposal by showing how it might be implemented. Our overarching aim is to assist manufacturers of immunotherapeutic products and other potentially breakthrough experimental therapies with the ethical task of prioritizing requests from scientific investigators when production capacity is limited.

This paper questions an exclusively state-centred framing of global health justice and proposes a multilateral alternative. Using the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to illustrate, we bring to light a broad range of global actors up and down the chain of vaccine development who contribute to global vaccine inequities. Section 1 (Background) presents an overview of moments in which diverse global actors, each with their own priorities and aims, shaped subsequent vaccine distribution. Section 2 (Collective action failures) characterises collective action failures (...) at each phase of vaccine development that contributed to global vaccine disparities. It identifies as critical the task of establishing upstream strategies to coordinate collective action at multiple stages across a range of actors. Section 3 (A Multilateral model of global health governance) takes up this task, identifying a convergence of interests among a range of stakeholders and proposing ways to realise them. Appealing to a responsibility to protect (R2P), a doctrine developed in response to human rights atrocities during the 1990s, we show how to operationalise R2P through a principle of subsidiarity and present ethical arguments in support of this approach. (shrink)

The Buddhist Jātaka tells the tale of a hare lounging under a palm tree who becomes convinced the Earth is coming to an end when a ripe bael fruit falls on its head. Soon all the hares are running; other animals join them, forming a stampede of deer, boar, elk, buffalo, wild oxen, rhinoceros, tigers and elephants, loudly proclaiming the earth is ending.1 In the American retelling, the hare is ‘chicken little,’ and the exaggerated fear is that the sky is (...) falling. The story offers a cautionary tale for considering the trend towards calamity thinking in artificial intelligence (AI). A growing chorus of tech leaders has warned that AI poses existential risk (X-Risk) that could result in the extinction of the human species, the collapse of civilisation, or a colossal decline in human potential and culture. In 2014, Hawking told the Washington Post that AI, ‘could spell the end of the human race’.2 Musk has repeatedly warned about AI’s perils, calling AI, ‘more dangerous than nukes’, recommending colonising Mars to ensure ‘a bolt-hole if AI goes rogue and turns on humanity’,3 and donating 10 million dollars to the Future of Life Institute to jumpstart research on AI’s X-Risk. Gates has stated, ‘I am in the camp…concerned about super intelligence…I agree with … Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned’.4 Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has fretted that technologies OpenAI was building could endanger humanity—‘even destroying the world as we know it’.5 This paper offers a critical appraisal of the rise of calamity thinking in the scholarly AI ethics literature. It cautions against viewing X-Risk in isolation and highlights ethical considerations sidelined when X-Risk takes centre stage. Section I introduces a working definition of X-Risk, considers its likelihood and …. (shrink)

This Commentary critiques Paul Showler’s combination view of robot moral status, which combines sophisticated cognitive capacities like consciousness with highly valued machine-human relationships. Showler holds that a combined approach carries the advantage of more fully accounting for ordinary folk psychology views about of what it means to have moral standing and be a person. This commentary paper is largely sympathetic to Showler, but argues for a stronger view: being a person is a cluster concept that can include a combination of (...) different possible sufficient conditions, none of which is necessary. What must be constrained, then, is the strong claim that a quality is necessary for personhood. Since most approaches that appeal to sophisticated cognitive capacities make the strong claim, they require constraint. Since most approaches that appeal to highly valued relationships, do not make the stronger claim, they generally do not require constraint. (shrink)

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing (...) to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 7, Page 802-808, September 2022.

This paper addresses bioethics in the context of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic. The Introduction (Section 1) highlights that at the field's inception, infectiousness was not front and center. Instead, infectious disease was widely perceived as having been conquered. This made it possible for bioethicists to center values such as individual autonomy, informed consent, and a statist conception of justice. Section 2 urges shifting to values more fitting for the moment the world is in. To find these, it directs (...) attention to the Global South, and in particular, Africa, and to the values of ubuntu, solidarity, dignity, kinship, and humility. The paper concludes (in Section 3) that 21st‐century challenges facing bioethics are increasingly global, and calls on bioethicists themselves to be more globally inclusive in their approaches. (shrink)

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing (...) to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. (shrink)

How should healthcare systems prepare to care for growing numbers and proportions of older people? Older people generally suffer worse health than younger people do. Should societies take steps to reduce age-related health inequalities? Some express concern that doing so would increase age-related inequalities in healthcare. This paper addresses this debate by presenting an argument in support of three principles for distributing scarce resources between age groups; framing these principles of age group justice in terms of life stages; and indicating (...) policy implications that merit further attention in light of rapidly aging societies. (shrink)

This Commentary critiques an extremely relational view of robot moral status, drawing out its practical implications for ethics and law. It also suggests next steps for AI ethics if extremely relational reasoning is compelling. Section I introduces the topic, distinguishing an ‘extremely relational’ view from more moderate relational views. Section II illustrates extremely relational views using the example of embodiment. Section III explores practical implications of extremely relational views for ethics and law. Section IV offers possible responses to extreme relationism. (...) Section V concludes by suggesting next steps for AI ethics. (shrink)

At any time, basic assumptions about language have a direct effect on the writing of history. The structure of language is related to the structure of knowledge and thus to the definition of historical reality, while linguistic competence gives insights into the relation of ideas and action. Within the framework of these ideas, and drawing on recent work in linguistic theory, including that of the French structuralists. Professor Struever studies the major shift in attitudes toward language and history which the (...) Renaissance represents. One of the essential innovations of Renaissance Humanism is the substitution of rhetoric for dialectic as the dominant language discipline; rhetoric gives the Humanists their cohesion as a lay intellectual elite, as well as the force and direction of their thought. The author accepts the current trend in classical studies, the rehabilitation of the Sophists which finds its source in Nietzsche and includes the work of Rostagni, Untersteiner, and Buccellato, to reinstate rhetoric as the historical vehicle of Sophistic insight. Originally published in 1970. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

While people are still alive, we owe them respect. Yet what, if anything, do we owe the newly dead? This question is an urgent practical concern for aged societies, because older people die at higher rates than any other age group. One novel way in which Japan, the frontrunner of aged societies, meets its need to accommodate high numbers of newly dead is itai hoteru or corpse hotels. Itai hoteru offer families a way to wait for space in over‐crowded crematoriums (...) while affording an environment conducive to grieving. Drawing on conversations with itai hoteru employees, we delineate the values this contemporary death practice expresses and show how these values comprise part of the broader idea of a good death. A good death implies duties on both sides of death's divide: to both the dying and the newly dead. (shrink)

In Ending Midlife Bias: New Values for Old Age, I argued that dignity can give practical guidance for patient care, especially dementia care.1 Using a capability-informed analysis, I detailed threats to central human capabilities that undermine dignity for people with dementia and provide practical suggestions for managing these threats in paradigm cases. In an article in this issue, Hojjat Soofi argues that a capability-informed account of dignity is exclusionary of people with dementia and does not translate into practical ethics guidance.2 (...) Soofi maintains that people with intellectual impairment ‘might not be able to exercise (or even have access to)’ the capabilities in question (Soofi, p4).2 Focusing on Nussbaum’s capability view, Soofi cautions, it gives a narrow, blinkered assessment of what it means to live a full and flourishing human life. In this commentary, I argue that Soofi’s critique of the capability view hastily generalises from a narrow set of premises to expansive, unwarranted conclusions. Soofi’s first objection, that a capability view of dignity excludes people with dementia, is a sweeping and strong claim. In its support, Soofi cites dignity of the Kantian sort, which requires ‘cognitive competence to exercise rational agency,’ to argue that ‘if we want to include people with dementia in the circle of human beings …. (shrink)

Stigmatization and sharming of healthcare workers in Japan during the coronavirus 2019 pandemic reveal uniquely Japanese features. Seken, usually translated as ‘social appearance or appearance in the eyes of others,’ is a deep undercurrent woven into the fabric of Japanese life. It has led to providers who become ill with the SARS-CoV-2 virus feeling ashamed, while concealing their conditions from coworkers and public health officials. It also has led to healthcare providers being perceived as polluted and their children being told (...) they were not welcome in schools. Although such experiences are not isolated to Japan and have appeared in other parts of the world, the cultural forces driving them in Japan are unique. Overcoming stigmatization and shaming of Japanese healthcare providers will require concerted efforts to understand cultural barriers and to view such practices as raising human rights issues affecting the safety and well-being of all. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper argues in support of the WHO’s proposal to forego COVID-19 booster shots until 10% of people in every country are fully vaccinated. The Ethical Argument section shows that we save the most lives and ensure the least amount of suffering by allocating doses first to unvaccinated people. It also argues that there is a duty to support decent lives and to promote health equity, which establish that refraining from boosters is a requirement of justice, not charity. The Replies (...) to Objections section answers objections that appeal to pragmatism, nationalism, ownership, scientific advancement, self-interest, semantics and futility. The Conclusion section emphasizes that for now, wealthy nations should not boost vaccinated people’s immunity and should instead send doses to poorer nations where they are most urgently needed. No data was used in this study. (shrink)

Global scarcity of COVID-19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID-19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case-based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing (...) to global disparities of COVID-19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID-19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. (shrink)